Infections among health-care workers (HCWs) have been a common feature of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) since its emergence. The majority of these infections have occurred in locations where infection-control precautions either had not been instituted or had been instituted but were not followed. Recommended infection-control precautions include the use of negative-pressure isolation rooms where available; N95 or higher level of respiratory protection; gloves, gowns, and eye protection; and careful hand hygiene. This report summarizes a cluster of SARS cases among HCWs in a hospital that occurred despite apparent compliance with recommended infection-control precautions (1) .
The index patient was a Canadian family physician aged 54 years with a history of hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and noninsulin-dependent diabetes controlled on oral medications. During April 1-2, 2003, he examined three patients who were family members involved in a community cluster of SARS in Toronto, Ontario (2) . No infection-control precautions were used. On April 4, he had fever, myalgia, headache, mild diarrhea, and a dry cough; on medical evaluation, he had a clear chest radiograph, but he continued to feel ill during home isolation. On April 8, he was reevaluated and found to have a left upper-lobe infiltrate on a repeat chest radiograph; he was admitted to the SARS ward of hospital A. During the next several days, he remained febrile with increasing cough, although his diarrhea resolved. On April 12, the patient's temperature was 104.7 º F (40.4 º C), his chest radiograph showed worsening pneumonia, and he required supplemental oxygen for hypoxia. He was treated with ipratropium bromide and albuterol sulfate by metered dose inhaler, intravenous (IV) ribavirin, and steroids. On April 12, he had a nearly constant cough and was assessed for transfer to the intensive care unit (ICU). On April 13, the patient was transported to the ICU in a wheelchair on 100% oxygen through nonrebreather face mask. Soon after his arrival in the ICU, his measured oxygen saturation decreased to 60%, and he was placed on positive pressure ventilation through face mask (BiPAP). Because of severe cough and agitation, he removed the mask repeatedly despite administration of IV sedation. After an approximately 2-hour attempt to provide oxygen through BiPAP, the patient was intubated. During intubation, he had copious frothy secretions that later obstructed the ventilator tubing, requiring disconnection and drainage. Once supported with mechanical ventilation, the patient was sedated further by using IV midazolam/morphine sulfate.
Later that evening, the patient was switched from assistcontrol ventilation to high-frequency oscillatory ventilation (HFOV) because of continued inadequate oxygenation. At this point, the patient's condition stabilized, and he was maintained on HFOV for 7 days, after which he was switched back to assist-control mode. As of May 14, the patient remained in critical condition. Both a sputum sample collected from the patient on April 13 and a stool sample collected on May 5 were positive for the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) by polymerase chain reaction.
During April 15-21, nine HCWs who had cared for this patient around the time he was intubated had illnesses consistent with the World Health Organization case definition for suspect or probable SARS (3); another two HCWs had symptoms that were not consisent with the case definition (Table) . Six of these 11 HCWs had been present during the intubation procedure. Interviews with affected HCWs indicated that they all had worn the recommended personal protective equipment each time they entered the patient's room, including gown, gloves, PCM2000 ™ duckbill masks (Kimberly Clark Health Care, Roswell, Georgia), and goggles with or without an overlying face shield.
The room in which the intubation took place was at negative pressure to the hallway, and all air was vented to the outside after high-efficiency particulate air filtration; however, no anteroom was available, and removal of personal protective equipment took place in a staged manner both inside and outside the room, with the door kept closed between each entry and exit. Understanding of the correct order to remove personal protective equipment (PPE) (i.e., gloves first followed by mask and goggles) varied among HCWs.
Masks worn by HCWs inside ICU rooms and halls were changed on leaving each patient's room; however, no formal respiratory protection program existed at the hospital, and individual workers had not been fit tested. In addition, the primary nurse for the patient had a small beard and reported that his mask did not fit well. Although he wore both a PCM2000 ™ duckbill mask and a surgical mask with face shield, he sometimes could feel air entering around the sides of his mask.
Health Canada and CDC are aware of several unpublished reports of SARS clusters among unprotected HCWs involved with intubation, both in Canada and outside North America. The cluster described in this report might be unique, as HCWs appear to have followed infection-control precautions recommended by Health Canada. The Health Canada recommendations, although similar to those of CDC, differ from CDC guidelines with respect to respiratory protection. CDC guidelines specify use of respirators approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) rated at an N95 level of protection or greater (7) . Health Canada recommends use of "N95 equivalent" respirators (8) . The respirators used in hospital A, although compliant with Canadian public health recommendations, were not NIOSH-approved. In addition, at the time these exposures occurred, fit testing was not recommended by Canadian public health authorities; such testing has been mandated in the United States since 1972.
Endotracheal intubation might cause an awake or a semiconcious patient to cough and often necessitates open suctioning of respiratory secretions. In addition, other potentially aerosol-generating procedures were performed on this patient, including BiPAP, during which air might be forced out around the face mask and thereby aerosolize secretions, and HFOV, during which exhaust from the ventilator tubing is more likely to escape without passing through an antibacterial/antiviral filter. The patient also was in his second week of illness with clinical deterioration and severe cough, possibly explaining why HCWs who were exposed to the patient only before his transfer to the ICU became infected, as the viral loads of patients at this stage of illness appear high (9) .
Direct contact with the patient or contact with an environment contaminated by large respiratory droplets might have led to HCWs infecting themselves as they removed their PPE. For example, HCWs have been known to spread other nosocomial pathogens from patient to patient despite the use of barrier precautions; even in the best of circumstances, correct use of PPE might be suboptimal. If contact or droplet spread alone were responsible for this cluster, a lapse in technique would be required on the part of each infected HCW. Many HCWs apparently lacked a clear understanding of how best to remove PPE without contaminating themselves. Alternatively, aerosolizing procedures or the patient's own cough might have led to airborne spread, and either the level of respiratory protection used or the manner in which it was used did not prevent transmission.
This cluster is part of a larger number of cases in HCWs in hospitals in the greater Toronto area who have become infected while caring for SARS patients since directives for contact, droplet, and airborne precautions were instituted at the provincial level on March 28 (1). Further investigation is necessary to determine factors associated with transmission despite the apparent use of recommended infection-control precautions.
HCWs caring for SARS patients should be properly trained in the correct use and removal of PPE and reminded of the importance of hand hygiene. Patients who are experiencing rapid clinical progression with severe cough during their second week of illness should be considered particularly infectious. Procedures that might generate aerosols (e.g., nebulized medications, BiPAP, or HFOV) should be avoided if possible. Table) (2) .
Of the 64 probable SARS patients, 44 (69%) were hospitalized, and three (5%) required mechanical ventilation. No SARS-related deaths have been reported in the United States. Of the 64 cases, 62 (97%) were attributed to international travel to areas with documented or suspected community transmission of SARS during the 10 days before illness onset; the remaining two (3%) probable cases occurred in a healthcare worker who provided care to a SARS patient and a household contact of a SARS patient. Among the 62 probable SARS cases attributed to travel, 35 (56%) patients reported travel to mainland China; 18 (29%) to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China; six (10%) to Singapore; three (5%) to Hanoi, Vietnam; and eight (13%) to Toronto, Canada. Seven (11%) of these 62 probable patients had visited more than one area with SARS during the 10 days before illness onset.
Laboratory testing to evaluate infection with the SARSassociated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) has been completed for 96 cases (23 probable and 73 suspect). Of 20 probable SARS patients with complete test results, six with laboratoryconfirmed infection with SARS-CoV have been identified (3, 4) ; this number remains unchanged since the last update (5) . None of the 73 suspect SARS patients evaluated has had laboratory-confirmed infection with SARS-CoV. Negative findings (i.e., the absence of antibody to SARS-CoV in convalescent serum obtained >21 days after symptom onset) have been documented for 90 cases (73 suspect and 17 probable).
Since the previous update (5), the epidemiology of SARS in the United States has not changed markedly; secondary spread to contacts such as family members and health-care workers is limited, and most cases continue to be associated with international travel to areas where SARS is being transmitted in the community. CDC has developed interim recommendations for businesses and other organizations with employees returning from areas with community transmission of SARS and for other organizations and institutions (e.g., schools) hosting persons arriving in the United States from such areas (6,7). CDC does not recommend quarantine of persons traveling to the United States from areas with SARS nor the cancellation or postponement of classes, meetings, or other gatherings that would include travelers from areas with SARS. Activities to prevent importation and spread of SARS from inbound travelers (6) include 1) pre-embarkation screening of persons traveling from areas with SARS, 2) assessment by health authorities of ill persons aboard flights arriving from areas with SARS to ensure that ill passengers are isolated and 
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TB disease before the completion of treatment. This report describes three cases that illustrate several issues associated with the deportation of patients with incomplete treatment of TB disease after detention. These cases highlight the need for interagency coordination to ensure completion of treatment for persons being evaluated or treated for TB.
Case Reports
Case 1. A man aged 28 years had drug-susceptible pulmonary TB diagnosed in Seattle, Washington, and was deported before completing TB treatment. One year later, he was apprehended in the United States and, after transfer to four correctional facilities, was found while in the San Francisco, California, county jail to have isoniazid (INH)-resistant TB. After 2 months of treatment for TB, he was again scheduled for deportation. Despite concerns raised by local public health officials and personnel from DIHS, the patient was deported without medications or a referral for treatment in his country. The patient told local TB-program staff that if deported, he would return to the United States. The patient's location is unknown.
Case 2. A man aged 36 years was found to have multidrugresistant TB while in INS custody in a local Texas jail. One month after starting treatment, he was released from a hospital prison ward without a plan for completing treatment. He was transferred through several INS contract detention facilities. The treatment course was complicated by the patient's refusal to take medicine. When the contract facility staff later expressed concern about the length of the 18-24 month treatment course and their inability to continue to provide it, the patient was transferred to a federal prison, and a federal judge ordered charges dropped against the patient. He was then deported after having completed only 4 months of treatment. The patient's location is unknown.
Case 3. A man aged 31 years with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection had sputum smear-positive TB diagnosed in California. He adhered fully to treatment for 2 months in the community before he was apprehended and placed in INS custody. Because of the patient's increased risk for TB relapse and for acquiring drug resistance, the local TB controller asked INS to recommend a "medical hold" to complete the patient's TB treatment. The state TB-control program cited state law to justify continuing treatment. Both efforts failed, and the final order of deportation was upheld. The local TB-control program was given 1 hour's notice in which to provide the detainee with a supply of medication and to refer the patient to CURE-TB, a binational referral agency to facilitate referral of medical information for TB patients who move across the U.S. border (2) . He returned to his family in the United States within 2 weeks of deportation and resumed treatment for TB.
DIHS Data
Data collected by DIHS for fiscal years 2001-2002 indicate that the prevalence of culture-confirmed TB reported from eight SPCs was approximately 67 cases per 100,000 INS detainees, and the average length of TB treatment in an SPC was 22 days before release or deportation. This rate was 12 times the overall U.S. incidence of 5.6 cases in 2001 and 2.5 times the rate for the U.S. foreign-born population (3 Editorial Note: The findings in this report demonstrate some of the barriers to post-detention completion of treatment of TB for INS detainees being deported, including the limited coordination among TB-control programs, federal agencies, and facilities that house INS detainees (4) . No uniform system exists to inform state and local TB programs when a person under detention by INS who has TB or suspected TB is released or deported. Federal immigration laws sometimes conflict with state health laws for TB control. Medical treatment often is not readily available to the deported person, and some of these persons might return to the United States while still infectious with TB. Effective treatment of persons with drugsusceptible TB requires a minimum duration of 6 months (5). One of the most challenging tasks in managing TB among detainees is the coordination of care during the postdetention period in the United States or in the patients' countries of origin.
As indicated in the three case reports, social and legal issues complicate the post-detention treatment period. No policies allow for completion of TB therapy in the United States after an immigration judge issues a final order of deportation, and INS is not authorized to hold a patient once a legal disposition has been made.
Deportation before treatment completion allows for the export and re-import of TB into the United States, thus plac-ing other detainees, law enforcement officials, and communities in the country of origin and in the United States at increased risk for exposure to persons with infectious TB. To reduce the risk for exporting and re-importing persons with TB diseases identified while in INS custody, in November 2002, ACET recommended that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Justice form a working group to resolve issues concerning the post-detention completion of TB treatment of persons released or deported from INS custody. ACET further recommended that the working group explore the feasibility of treating INS detainees in the United States until their TB is cured in the least restrictive setting.
ACET proposed revising or amending current policies or federal laws for detainees who are being evaluated or receiving treatment for TB disease to allow deportation only after the responsible state TB controller or their designate reviews and approves the treatment plan. For cases of multidrugresistant TB, the availability of drugs needed to complete treatment in the country of origin should be ensured before deportation. Progress on these recommendations will involve working with professional correctional associations to improve adherence to local public health laws and CDC guidelines for TB screening and case notification and to enhance collaboration among INS SPCs, contract facilities, and TB programs.
Protocols should be developed to require the sharing of medical information and safeguarding its confidentiality and to describe mechanisms for the transfer of care when a patient is deported or released to the community. ACET recommended that appropriate agencies require the reporting of TB and suspected TB patients in INS custody before the transfer or deportation of INS detainees with TB to DIHS and state and local TB-control programs of jurisdictions in which sending and receiving facilities are located. In addition, ACET recommends the expansion of the medical hold authority of DIHS to permit notification of receiving health-care providers or a national referral program (e.g., CURE-TB or TBNet) † , transfer of medical records, and provision of sufficient TB medications to ensure treatment until the patient's care is resumed (ACET, unpublished data, 2002).
Motivational Intervention to Reduce
Alcohol-Exposed PregnanciesFlorida, Texas, and Virginia,
1997-2001
Prenatal alcohol use is a threat to healthy pregnancy outcomes for many U.S. women. During 1999, approximately 500,000 pregnant women reported having one or more drinks during the preceding month, and approximately 130,000 reported having seven or more alcohol drinks per week or engaging in binge drinking (i.e., five or more drinks in a day) (1). These heavier drinking patterns have been associated with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) and alcohol-related neurodevelopmental disorders (ARND) (2) . Lower levels of alcohol consumption (i.e., fewer than seven drinks per week) also have been associated with measurable effects on children's development and behavior (3, 4) . Although the majority of women reduce their alcohol use substantially when they realize they are pregnant, a large proportion do not realize they are pregnant until well into the first trimester and, therefore, might continue to drink alcohol during this critical period of fetal development. To reduce alcohol-exposed pregnancies, CDC initiated a multisite pilot study (phase I clinical trial) in 1997 to investigate the use of a dual intervention focused on both alcohol-use reduction and effective contraception among childbearing-aged women at high risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy (Project CHOICES) (5). This report describes the association between baseline drinking measures and the success women have achieved in reducing their risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy. The analysis compares the impact of the motivational intervention at 6-month follow-up on women drinking at high-, medium-, and low-risk drinking levels. The findings indicate that although 69% of the women in the study reduced their risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy, women with the lowest baseline drinking measures achieved the highest rates of outcome success, primarily by choosing effective contraception and, secondarily, by reducing alcohol use. Women with higher baseline drinking measures chose † CURE-TB and TBNet are U.S.-based referral programs that assist mobile patients to access and complete TB treatment. CURE-TB, operated by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's TB-Control Program, focuses on patients crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. TBNet, operated by the nonprofit Migrant Clinicians Network in Austin, Texas, specializes in migrant populations in the United States. The programs are working together and with INS to assist detainees in continuing TB treatment on release from custody.
MMWR May 16, 2003
(MMWR on line)
cdc.gov/mmwr Online both approaches equally but achieved lower success rates for reducing their risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy. A randomized controlled trial of the motivational intervention is under way to further investigate outcomes of the phase I study. Reproductive-aged (18-44 years), sexually active, fertile women were included in the study if they reported risk drinking (i.e., more than seven drinks per week on average or having one or more binge-drinking episodes during the preceding 3 months) and using ineffective contraception. Ineffective contraception was defined according to the type of contraceptive method reported by the participant, and the failure to use that method in accordance with the published recommendations (6) without using an appropriate back-up method (7) . Study participants were recruited from community-based settings with higher documented rates of women at risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy, including a large urban jail (Texas); residential alcohol and drug treatment facilities (Texas); a gynecology clinic serving low-income women (Virginia); two primary care clinics serving low-income populations (Virginia and Florida); and media solicitation (Florida). Each participant provided written informed consent on forms approved by site-specific Institutional Review Boards and CDC's Institutional Review Board. Recruitment took place from spring 1999 to summer 2000.
Of 2,384 women screened in Florida, Texas, and Virginia, 230 were eligible for the study; 190 (83%) consented to participate and were enrolled. Participants received a maximum of four motivational counseling sessions and one visit to a family planning provider. As part of the study, participants also completed an interview at enrollment and at 6-month follow-up to assess the impact of the brief intervention. At both times, methods of contraception were assessed along with the effectiveness of use. In addition, information was collected about drinking history, recent drinking, emotional distress, awareness of FAS and anti-drinking messages targeted to pregnant women, and sociodemographic characteristics. AUDIT (8), a screening instrument developed by the World Health Organization that incorporates questions about drinking (i.e., quantity, frequency, and binge drinking) and the consequences of drinking, was administered at baseline. The AUDIT instrument has been reported to be valid and reliable across different cultures, settings, and age groups (9) . This test provided a range of scores from which categorical levels of risk drinking were developed. Scores were grouped into three drinking categories according to level of severity: low (1-7), medium (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) , and high (19-40). The goals of the motivational interviewing sessions were to provide personalized feedback on the risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy, to motivate participants to change one or both of the target alcohol-use behaviors (i.e., decreasing alcohol intake to fewer than eight drinks per week and no binge drinking), to decrease the temptation to engage in risk drinking and increase confidence to avoid it, and to encourage the use of effective contraception through contraceptive counseling visits. Descriptive statistics were calculated for baseline demographic and risk characteristics of women included in the analysis. In addition, bivariate analysis and logistic regression were conducted to assess differences between the baseline and the post-intervention status of the target outcome behaviors.
Of the 190 women enrolled in the study, approximately one third were from each site in Florida, Texas, and Virginia. Data about contraception use and drinking information were available both at enrollment and at 6-month follow-up interviews for 143 (75%) women. The majority (119) of study participants were members of racial/ethnic minorities (45% non-Hispanic black, 37% non-Hispanic white, 9% Hispanic, and 9% other), and the median age of participants was 31 years (range: 18-44 years); 147 (77%) reported having at least a high school education, and 121 (64%) reported annual incomes of <$20,000. Of the 190 women at baseline, 188 (99%) reported binge drinking on one or more occasions during the preceding 6 months, and 123 (65%) women reported frequent drinking. A total of 122 (64%) reported both drinking behaviors (binge and frequent drinking).
The average baseline AUDIT score was 17 (range: 1-40). Scores of >8 indicate a strong likelihood of excessive alcohol use. A woman was considered not at risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy at the 6-month follow-up if she had reduced drinking (i.e., fewer than eight drinks per week and fewer than five drinks on a day during the preceding 6 months), used effective contraception, or both. The association among baseline AUDIT scores and reduced drinking, effective contraception, and reduced risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy at 6-month follow-up documented different patterns (Figure) scores. An inverse association was observed between AUDIT scores at baseline and reduced risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy at 6 months (p = 0.01) (Figure) . Women with the lowest AUDIT scores were the most likely to reduce their risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy (27 [90%]), compared with those with medium and high scores (37 [67%], p<0.03 and 34
[59%], p<0.005, respectively). Logistic regression analysis was used to assess the association between baseline AUDIT scores and reduced risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy in the presence of potential confounders (e.g., income, marital status, education, and age). The baseline AUDIT score was the strongest predictor for reduced risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy. Therefore, women's baseline drinking levels influenced their choices of how to reduce their risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy by either instituting effective contraception use, reducing risk drinking, or both. Editorial Note: Fertile women who are sexually active, consume more than seven drinks per week or binge drink, and do not use effective contraception are at risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy and having a child with lifelong impairments in intellectual, cognitive, and psychosocial functioning (4). Preventing FAS or ARND requires intervening not only with pregnant women but also with childbearingaged women before conception. Brief interventions using motivational interviewing techniques are effective among childbearing-aged women in reducing harmful drinking patterns (10) . Women in this study reduced their risk for alcoholexposed pregnancy by reducing their alcohol consumption risk, increasing their use of effective contraception, or both.
Among high-risk women overall, 69% were able to reduce their risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy.
Project CHOICES differs from other intervention studies because it offers effective contraception use in addition to reduced drinking as a strategy for decreasing the risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy. Although successful among all AUDIT score categories, this dual intervention had a differential impact on behavior change dependent on the participants' baseline alcohol use and experienced consequences of alcohol use (AUDIT score). Women with low AUDIT scores were more successful in reducing their risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy at the 6-month follow-up visit (90%), mostly by increasing their use of effective contraception. In comparison, women with higher AUDIT scores were more successful in reducing their alcohol use than women with lower AUDIT scores but were less likely to adopt effective contraceptive use. Women with lower alcohol use patterns at baseline might not have perceived their alcohol use patterns as problematic but did respond to the message of effective contraception use to avoid an unintended prenatal alcohol exposure. Women with higher alcohol-use patterns might have been more sensitized to the potential problematic nature of their alcohol use and might have chosen to reduce drinking because of their desire to improve their overall health.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, sample sizes were not sufficient to assess the impact of rates of change of reduced risk for an alcoholexposed pregnancy between and within the community-based settings. Although some sociodemographic differences were noted among the settings, rates of change for an alcoholexposed pregnancy across sites were similar (65%-72%), as indicated in previous findings (5) , suggesting that the impact of these site differences did not affect the study outcomes. Second, no control group was used, thus limiting the evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention. Third, the study was based on self-reported alcohol drinking and contraception-use data. Therefore, some participants' reports of change might have been attributable to social desirability or wanting to please the study personnel. However, the accuracy of selfreports in alcohol treatment studies is comparable to that of biochemical validation or collateral reports (10) .
Providing an effective option for reducing the risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy to high-risk women who do not respond to strategies focusing on alcohol-use reduction is an important step for FAS prevention. To address the limitations of this study, a randomized controlled trial is under way to test the efficacy of this intervention and will include sufficient sample sizes to assess the impact of different settings on the intervention outcome. Until more definitive findings are available, this information might interest counselors, clinicians, and other public health providers concerned with the prevention of FAS and other prenatal alcohol-related conditions.
Update: Adverse Events Following Civilian Smallpox VaccinationUnited States, 2003
During January 24-May 2, 2003, smallpox vaccine was administered to 35,903 civilian health-care and public health workers in 55 jurisdictions to prepare the United States for a possible terrorist attack using smallpox virus. This report updates information on vaccine-associated adverse events among civilians vaccinated since the beginning of the program and among contacts of vaccinees received by CDC from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) as of May 2.
In this vaccination program, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and state health departments are conducting surveillance for vaccine-associated adverse events among civilian vaccinees (1) . As part of the vaccination program, civilian vaccinees receive routine follow-up, and reported adverse events after vaccination receive follow-up as needed. The U.S. Department of Defense is conducting surveillance for vaccine-associated adverse events among military vaccinees and providing follow-up care to those persons with reported adverse events.
Adverse events that have been associated with smallpox vaccination are classified on the basis of evidence supporting the reported diagnoses. Cases verified by virologic testing are classified as confirmed (Table 1) . Cases are classified as probable if possible alternative etiologies are investigated and excluded and supportive information for the diagnosis is found. Cases are classified as suspected if they have clinical features compatible with the diagnosis, but either further investigation is required or investigation of the case did not provide supporting evidence for the diagnosis. All reports of events that follow vaccination are accepted (i.e., events associated temporally); however, reported adverse events are not necessarily associated causally with vaccination, and some or all of these events might be coincidental. This report includes cases reported as of May 2 that either are under investigation or have a reported final diagnosis. Because of ongoing discussions of final case definitions, numbers and classifications of adverse events might change and will be updated regularly in
MMWR.
As of May 2, a total of 15 cases of myopericarditis have been reported (Table 1) ; no new or reclassified cases were recorded during April 26-May 2. During the vaccination program, no cases of eczema vaccinatum, erythema multiforme major, fetal vaccinia, postvaccinial encephalitis or encephalomyelitis, or progressive vaccinia have been reported (Table 1) . The decreased total for inadvertent inoculations (nonocular) from 28 to 15 cases during the program is based on receipt of additional information on those removed (2).
During April 26-May 2, five other serious adverse events were reported: one case of chest tightness with electrocardiogram changes, one case of polyneuropathy, and three cases of atypical chest pain (Table 2) . Also during this period, 42 other nonserious events were reported (Table 2) . Among the 455 vaccinees with reported other nonserious adverse events during January 24-May 2, the most common signs and symptoms were fever (n = 88), rash (n = 85), headache (n = 76), pain (n = 75), and fatigue (n = 69) ( Table 2 ). All of these commonly reported events are consistent with mild expected reactions following receipt of smallpox vaccine. Some vaccinees reported multiple signs and symptoms.
During this reporting period, no vaccinia immune globulin was released for civilian vaccinees. No cases of vaccine transmission from civilian vaccinees to their contacts have been reported during the vaccination program (Table 3) . A total of nine cases of transmission from military personnel to civilian contacts have been reported. This figure is five less than that in a previous report because of viral cultures being negative in the cases removed from the list (2). Surveillance for adverse events during the civilian and military smallpox vaccination programs is ongoing; regular surveillance reports will be published in MMWR. 
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Notice to Readers
Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine Shortage Resolved
In February 2000, Prevnar ™ , a 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine manufactured by Wyeth Lederle Vaccines (Pearl River, New York), was licensed for use among infants and young children. Beginning in August 2001, the supply of Prevnar ™ failed to meet demand, resulting in shortages for health-care providers and health departments. To conserve the limited supply and ensure protection of children at highest risk, CDC published interim recommendations for vaccination that called for withholding vaccine from healthy children aged >2 years and deferring some doses for healthy children aged <2 years (1, 2) . Despite the shortage, introduction of the vaccine has been associated with a 69% decline in invasive disease among children aged <2 years through 2001 (78% for vaccine serotypes and 50% for vaccine-related serotypes) (3) .
Vaccine production and deliveries are now adequate to permit a return to the routine vaccination schedule (4).
According to data from CDC tracking systems and the manufacturer, the average number of vaccine doses delivered monthly for each of the preceding 3 months exceeded the monthly estimated average national need, and all back orders have been filled in both the public and private sectors.
According to the original Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations (4) and more recent guidance from CDC (5), all children aged <24 months and 24-59 months who are at increased risk for pneumococcal disease (e.g., children with sickle cell disease or anatomic asplenia, chronic illness, a cerebrospinal fluid leak, a cochlear implant, or an immunocompromising condition) should be administered the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. In addition, providers should consider vaccine for all other children aged 24-59 months, with priority given to children aged 24-35 months, American Indian/Alaska Native and black children, and those who attend group child care.
A catch-up schedule is provided for children who are incompletely vaccinated (Table) . The highest priority for catchup vaccination is to ensure that children aged <5 years at high risk for invasive pneumococcal disease because of medical conditions have received a complete series. Second priorities include vaccination of healthy children aged <24 months who have not received any doses of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and healthy children aged <12 months who have not yet received 3 doses.
Because of the frequency of health-care provider visits for children during their first 18 months, catch-up vaccination might occur at regularly scheduled visits for most children who receive vaccines from their primary-care provider; special notification should be considered for children who have completed their 15-month visit and are not scheduled to be seen again before the visit at age 2 years. Programs that provide vaccinations but do not see children routinely for other reasons also should consider a notification process to contact undervaccinated or unvaccinated children.
Reporting Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Among Vaccinees
CDC is investigating situations in which invasive pneumococcal disease occurs despite vaccination. Health-care providers are encouraged to report invasive pneumococcal disease occurring in children aged <5 years who have received >1 doses of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine to CDC through state health departments. If pneumococcal isolates are available from vaccinated children, CDC will perform serotyping to determine whether the strain is a type included in the vaccine. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ nip/diseases/pneumo/PCV-survrpts/default.htm. 
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Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Birth Defects Awareness Week, May 11-18, 2003
The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence has designated May 11-18, 2003, as Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Birth Defects Awareness Week. This year's theme, "Preserving Families," encourages persons to recognize the detrimental effects alcohol can have on persons and families and urges women of childbearing age to assess their drinking habits. Early identification of women at risk for an alcohol-exposed pregnancy is critical to preventing fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) and other prenatal alcohol-related conditions.
Prenatal alcohol exposure can result in facial abnormalities, growth deficits, and central nervous system problems, the most severe of which is FAS. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the recognition of FAS (1) . Despite efforts to prevent alcohol-exposed pregnancies, binge and frequent drinking among both pregnant and nonpregnant women continues (2) .
FAS is preventable when a woman does not drink alcohol when she is pregnant or could become pregnant. One prevention strategy to reduce alcohol use that has demonstrated promising results involves brief, behavioral counseling interventions (3). Another related but more in-depth counseling approach incorporates motivational interviewing techniques. In this issue of MMWR, findings from Project CHOICES, a CDC-funded motivational intervention designed to reduce alcohol-exposed pregnancies among high-risk women of childbearing age, are presented. Providing effective alternatives for reducing the risk of an alcohol-exposed pregnancy to women who might not respond to alcohol reduction strategies is an important step toward FAS prevention.
Additional information about Alcohol and Other DrugRelated Birth Defects Awareness Week is available at http:// www.ncadd.org. Additional information about FAS and other prenatal alcohol-related conditions is available from CDC at http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fas, from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism at http://www.niaaa. nih.gov, and through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration at http://www.samhsa.gov. High risk § <3 doses 1 dose >2 months after the most recent dose and another dose >2 months later 3 doses 1 dose >2 months after the most recent dose * For children vaccinated at age <1 year, the minimum interval between doses is 4 weeks. Doses administered at >12 months should be at least 8 weeks apart. † Providers should consider 1 dose for healthy children aged 24-59 months, with priority to children aged 24-35 months, American Indian/Alaska Native and black children, and those who attend group child care centers. § Children with sickle cell disease, asplenia, human immunodeficiency virus infection, chronic illness, cochlear implant, or immunocompromising condition.
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Online know what matters.
e ncore.
Week after week, MMWR Online plays an important role in helping you stay informed. From the latest CDC guidance to breaking health news, count on MMWR Online to deliver the news you need, when you need it.
Log on to cdc.gov/mmwr and enjoy MMWR performance.
Notice to Readers
Department of Health and Human Services and Public Health Training Network Satellite Broadcast and Webcast
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Public Health Training Network (PHTN) will present "Steps to a HealthierUS: RFA Guidance," a live, interactive satellite broadcast and webcast on May 22, 2003, from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m., EST. The broadcast will describe DHHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson's "Steps to a HealthierUS (Steps)," a new prevention initiative that focuses on reducing the burden of chronic diseases and addressing the lifestyle choices that are responsible for some of the leading causes of death and disability.
The broadcast will help applicants in preparing their responses to the Request for Applications (RFA) for the Steps Program and will focus on the application process, eligibility criteria, program requirements, desired content of the applications, and how the applications will be judged. A questionand-answer session will enable participants to ask questions to panelists through toll free telephone, fax, or TTY lines. The program is designed for all potential applicants for the Steps program announcement (i.e., official state and local health departments, and federally recognized tribal governments and U.S. Territories).
Additional information about site availability, broadcast coordinates, program content, resource materials, and accessing the live broadcast/webcast is available at http://www. phppo.cdc.gov/phtn/RFA.
Notice to Readers
Buckle Up America Week: Focus on Teens and Young Adults, May 19-26, 2003
Motor-vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for teenagers and young adults. In 2000, a total of 6,041 persons aged 16-20 years died from motor-vehicle crashes (1). Safetybelt use is the most effective means of reducing fatal and nonfatal injuries in motor-vehicle crashes. Teenagers and young adults are among those with the lowest safety-belt use rates. In 2002, safety belt use among those aged 16-24 years was 69%, the lowest safety-belt use among all age groups, compared with a national estimate of 75% among all ages (2) . Greater safety-belt use in teens and young adults would substantially decrease unintentional death and injuries in the United States.
Buckle Up America Week involves a wide range of efforts to promote safety-belt use among all persons in the United States to achieve the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's goal of 90% safety-belt use by 2005 (3) and the national health objective for 2010 of 92% safety-belt use (4). Safety-belt laws and enhanced law enforcement are among the most effective means for increasing widespread safety-belt use (5) . The combination of education and public awareness targeted to those most at risk and high-visibility law enforcement provides the greatest opportunity to make immediate gains in safety-belt use that can be sustained over time. These strategies were endorsed and recommended by the Task Force on Community Preventive Services to reduce injuries to motor-vehicle occupants. Recommendations are available at http://www.thecommunityguide.org (6) . Additional information on Buckle Up America activities is available at http:// www.buckleupamerica.org.
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